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he spirit of presentism haunts constitutional scholarship. The 
key debate tries to identify those aspects of present-day real-
ities which drive constitutional change – a shift in social mo-
res, the rise of social movements, a change in party balance, or 
simply the death and replacement of justices.  
Chinn moves beyond presentism, without disputing its undoubt-
ed importance. For him, the Court’s work also represents an on-
going and self-conscious effort to synthesize past principles into a 
constitutional order that makes sense to Americans of the present 
and future.  
This judicial enterprise becomes particularly challenging in the 
wake of a sweeping transformation – like those occurring during 
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights Revolution. 
Given the system of checks and balances, it takes a lot of time and 
effort to pass the constitutional amendments and landmark statutes 
required to revolutionize fundamental principles. Even if a political 
movement is sufficiently powerful to leap through this obstacle 
course, it will inevitably lose momentum long before it can tell law-
yers everything they want to know about the nature of the new con-
stitutional regime.  
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A key problem is constitutional synthesis: while the new 
amendments and statutes announce large principles, they don’t en-
tirely repudiate the legacy left by previous generations of constitu-
tional politics. How then to put Humpty-Dumpty together again, 
melding new and old principles into a coherent constitutional order? 
As the political movement for constitutional reform begins to 
lose control of the House, Senate, and Presidency, the Supreme 
Court is left to answer this question more-or-less on its own. Here 
is where Chinn offers a helpful trichotomy: the Court’s first task 
will be to delimit the scope of the new principles, and thereby define 
what is living and what is dead in the constitutional legacy left by the 
past. Later on, it will elaborate order-creating opinions that give more 
affirmative meaning to the new constitutional principles; these prin-
ciples will, of course, sometimes conflict with others derived from 
earlier constitutional moments, requiring the Court to confront a 
third, and more standard, task: writing opinions that seek to resolve 
the tensions between constitutional principles inherited from differ-
ent eras of our constitutional development. This functionalist tri-
chotomy makes a lot of sense, but it shouldn’t be treated as a rigid 
law of judicial evolution: delimitation, order-creation, and tension-
resolution are on-going processes, though one function may well be 
more salient at an early stage while others gain in importance later. 
With this caveat, Chinn’s trichotomy helps moves the debate be-
yond presentism: while current social and political realities, as well 
as the particular character of the justices, certainly do matter, so too 
do the Justices self-conscious understanding of their role in sustain-
ing the constitutional regime through serial acts of intergenerational 
synthesis.  
Chinn’s trichotomy also offers an antidote for another presentist 
tendency – the habit of modern day lawyers to judge judicial deci-
sions of the distant past by contemporary standards. It is increasingly 
common, for example, to say that Slaughterhouse’s evisceration of 
the “privileges” or “immunities” clause was “wrongly decided” – 
without a serious consideration of the distinctive way the justices 
framed their interpretive problem in 1873. Chinn’s analysis offers a 
different perspective. Instead of asking whether Slaughterhouse was 
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“rightly” or “wrongly” decided, he invites us to consider how the 
Court confronted its problem of delimitation: On the one hand, 
Republican Reconstruction did represent a quantum leap forward 
toward a more nation-centered understanding of We the People; 
but on the other hand, it did not represent a total repudiation of the 
Founding legacy of constitutional federalism. How, then, should the 
Court mark off the central concerns of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments while leaving some space for the very different understand-
ings of federalism inherited from the Founding?  
By reframing the question, Chinn opens up a new path to inter-
pretive insight. For all we know, the coming decades will once again 
generate a constitutional revolution – perhaps on a scale rivaling 
Reconstruction. And the Court, once again, will be placed in the 
position of delimiting the scope of the new constitutional achieve-
ments. From this vantage, there is something more important to 
learn from Slaughterhouse than whether it was “correctly” decided. 
Instead of fixating on the bottom-line, it will pay to study the differ-
ent techniques deployed by Justice Miller and his colleagues ap-
proaching their problem of delimitation. If the legal community en-
gages with the Slaughterhouse opinions on this methodological level, 
twenty-first century judiciary might actually learn something useful 
when confronting similar problems of delimitation in the future.  
As Chinn rightly suggests, the great transformations of the twen-
tieth century – the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution – also 
left the Justices confronting the basic questions of delimitation, and 
will also serve as a rich resource of methodological insight. The 
same can be said, of course, when we turn to consider the order-
creating and tension-resolving opinions that Chinn has identified. 
Three cheers, then, for Chinn’s trichotomy, and its promise of in-
sight into two centuries of judicial effort to make sense of a constitu-
tional tradition that has been made and remade through the efforts 
of many generations of constitutional politics. 
It is at this point, alas, that I must part company. When he views 
the Court through his tri-opticon, Chinn manages to see a curiously 
monotonic image. Whether the Court is engaged in delimitation, 
order-creation, or tension-resolution, Chinn thinks that it always 
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has the same objective: trying to stabilize the regime by creating 
clear and bright lines. I don’t agree, but it will take a book to pro-
vide my affirmative account.1 For now, let me suggest two basic 
problems with Chinn’s monotonic proposal. 
The problem of dissent. When the Court speaks by a narrow major-
ity, whatever it says is unstable. Everybody knows that the Court 
may change its mind in a few years, depending on future appoint-
ments. Rather than stabilizing the regime in a decisive fashion, most 
important decisions simply resolve a particular controversy. Their 
larger significance is the way they shape and reshape an on-going 
constitutional conversation – introducing new themes, eliminating 
others from the realm of serious legal argument.  
Return to Slaughterhouse one more time: While Miller’s five-
judge majority opinion was influential, so was Field’s dissent. It’s a 
fair question whether Miller or Field was more influential over the 
next fifty years. The fact that Field only got four votes certainly 
didn’t banish his views from the on-going constitutional dialogue. 
The Justices are perfectly aware of the disruptive power of dis-
sent – and they may sometimes try to win greater authoritativeness 
by handing down a unanimous opinion. But even unanimity may not 
suffice to generate stability. Think Brown v. Board or Cooper v. Aaron. 
It was the civil rights movement, not the Court, that finally stabi-
lized the new regime by creating a political environment that al-
lowed the President and Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
Ought implies can – since the Justices know that they can’t stabi-
lize the regime simply by handing down a decisive-looking opinion, 
it seems implausible to suppose, with Chinn, that this is what they 
think they ought to be doing. Since Justices can’t accomplish Chinn’s 
goal, it is far more likely that each sets a more modest objective for 
him/herself: to write opinions that make constitutional sense, and per-
suade their various audiences that their constitutional interpretations are 
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more meaningful than those offered up by their rivals on the Court.  
If anything serves to stabilize the regime, it is this on-going judi-
cial dialogue (better, multi-logue). The multilogue draws in many 
sectors of the population that might otherwise be alienated by a se-
ries of judicial ipse-dixits that aim to establish order once and for all. 
While different social groups will lose particular court decisions, the 
fact that dissenters are expressing their concerns in legal language 
may sustain their engagement in the constitutional enterprise. 
Or it may not. Court-centered multilogue has broken down in 
the past, and may well break down in the future. But when it does, 
the Justices have little choice but to rely on political leadership to 
hammer out revised constitutional understandings.  
Clarity and stability? Even when the Justices do aim to stabilize the 
regime, this effort rarely generates the clarity that Chinn hypothe-
sizes – rather the reverse. As we all know, the typical unanimous 
opinion is generally full of obscurities and incongruities – as the Jus-
tices struggle to paper over their underlying disagreements. The 
judicial quest for stability generates legal obscurity, not clarity.  
There are exceptions to this rule. Darby and Wickard – the 
Court’s famous opinions codifying the New Deal –– are unanimous 
and clear. But this is because Roosevelt and his Democratic Con-
gresses had already stabilized the new regime by the late 1930s 
through a series of landmark statutes and transformative Supreme 
Court appointments. This permitted the Court to announce to the 
legal world what everybody-already-knew: that the American peo-
ple had decisively repudiated the principles of limited federal gov-
ernment that had guided the Republic between 1868 and 1932.  
If you want to find real clarity, the place to look is the solo dis-
sent: Harlan or Holmes or Brandeis or Scalia can be clear because 
they have given up on their colleagues and are appealing to some 
future age for redemption. If an opinion-writer is trying to win the 
support of a decisive majority, compromise will often lead to doc-
trinal confusion.  
Moving beyond small group dynamics, clarity can also be coun-
terproductive in stabilizing the larger regime. Sometimes it is better 
for the court to hide the ball as it creeps toward the elaboration of a 
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clear principle – this is, at least, the lesson of Alex Bickel’s Least 
Dangerous Branch; and Cass Sunstein is even more timid, worrying 
that the clear statement of any strong principle is apt to generate 
destabilizing backlash. 
So muddling through might sometimes be the best way to stabi-
lize – assuming (which I don’t) that this is what the Justices are in-
variably aiming for.  
To sum up; Chinn’s article is a real breakthrough – inviting all of 
us to ask important new questions. But I don’t think he has an-
swered his questions in the right way.  
But I’m sure that Chinn will have lots to say in his defense – 
leading both of us to glimpse better answers than those which we 
can presently envision. Perhaps others will join in as well. Whatever 
the future holds, Professor Chinn has certainly earned a place at the 
table!   
 
 
